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Quantum mechanics (QM) has long been thought to challenge scientific re-
alism. The Copenhagen school maintained that QM was unable to provide
the realist’s sought after description of microscopic reality. Today, many believe
such a description can be found, but new challenges have arisen. This impressive
collection of essays seeks to explore several such challenges. The contributions
cover a range of different issues and viewpoints bearing on the broad topic of
realism and QM. In this review, I’ll touch on three main themes.
1 Underdetermination
There are three mainstream realist approaches to the measurement problem:
hidden variables (Bohmian mechanics), spontaneous collapse (the GRW the-
ory), and many worlds (the Everett interpretation). Within the realm of current
experimental access, each approach is empirically adequate, but they differ con-
siderably in what they take the world to be like. Prima facie, this is a textbook
case of underdetermination: different theories, each equally supported by the
empirical evidence but mutually inconsistent. Left unresolved, the realist’s in-
ference from empirical success to a description of reality is undermined. Which
description of reality? What are things really like such that QM works as well
as it does?
This underdetermination is problematic because of the realist’s ambition to
take QM as an approximately true description of reality. However, if one drops
or weakens this aim, perhaps realism can be rendered compatible with the cur-
rent plurality of interpretations. Broadly speaking, this is the approach of Carl
Hoefer (ch.2) and Juha Saatsi (ch.3). Both authors accept that underdetermi-
nation prevents the realist from endorsing the approximate truth of any given
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interpretation of QM. On Hoefer’s Tautological Scientific Realism, we ought
to only believe in “those parts of contemporary science that can no longer be
reasonably doubted” (p.24) and any particular interpretation can certainly be
doubted—one of its rivals could be true. Similarly, Saatsi’s Progress Realism
eschews the “deep metaphysics” about which interpretations differ. By weak-
ening realist commitment in this way, these approaches preserve realism about
other areas of science in the face of quantum underdetermination.
But such a resolution comes at a cost. Central to many realists about QM is a
need to provide explanations of certain phenomena. For instance, the stability of
a hydrogen atom is only adequately explained by appeal to QM. The explanans
of such an explanation will involve details about how the ground state is to be
understood, which will be interpretation dependent, and hence, off limits for
these version of realism. One might hope for a core of quantum claims that are
neither reasonably dubitable nor “deep metaphysics,” but as Craig Callender
highlights (ch.4), interpretations differ significantly even about matters close the
empirical periphery of QM. Moreover, even if one is happy to forgo quantum
explanations until such a time that the underdetermination is resolved, it’s not
clear that other areas of science are immune from the quantum blight. Is it really
possible to understand things like “the existence and many basic properties of
the atoms of the periodic table” (Hoefer, p.25) without appeal to QM? If not,
then the explanations provided by the basic properties of atoms lose much of
their appeal.
There’s a simpler way of resolving underdetermination that doesn’t require
sacrificing QM’s explanatory power. If there’s a single correct interpretation of
QM, then the underdetermination is only apparent. A simple naturalism might
recommend looking to scientific practice to determine the content of QM. This
might resolve the underdetermination, but potentially at the cost of blocking
reflection on the best way to understand QM. However, as J.E. Wolff (ch.6)
argues, one can also view the different interpretations as rival scientific theories
which can be assessed in terms of their theoretical virtues. Then, the real-
ist might hope that one theory emerges as best and thereby worthy of realist
commitment.
David Wallace (ch.5) argues for this conclusion regarding the Everett inter-
pretation. His argument begins with the claim that QM is a framework theory :
like classical mechanics, QM is an abstract formalism which can be applied to a
variety of different concrete situations. Ordinary non-relativistic QM is one of
a number of instances of the quantum framework, quantum field theory (QFT)
is another. However, interpretations such as Bohmian mechanics and the GRW
theory focus on non-relativistic QM, which they treat as a fundamental the-
ory of physics despite its well-known limitations. This leaves Everett as the
only viable interpretation of QM qua framework theory. Of course, Wallace
is a long-standing advocate of the Everett interpretation and defenders of ri-
val interpretations would object to this characterization. As Callender notes,
“the very features that allow the Everettian interpretation its easy extension to
new physics are precisely the same features that invite its problems and whose
solutions by other programs lead to their explanatory virtues” (p.74).
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Indeed, even if rivals have yet to be applied to fully-fledged relativistic QFT,
the measurement problem still demands a solution in that context, and these
interpretations may be seen as competing research programs to do just that.
So, even if we grant Wallace’s claim that there isn’t underdetermination in the
extant approaches to QM, the threat of underdetermination remains in the pos-
sibility that one of these approaches may succeed in developing a rival account
of QFT. A notable form of underdetermination is the problem of unconceived
alternatives [Stanford, 2006], but the situation here is one of merely under-
developed alternatives. The only way to rule out this possibility is to argue
that such constructions are impossible in principle, which Wallace hasn’t done.
There are other forms of quantum underdetermination beyond that gener-
ated by the presence of multiple realist solutions to the measurement problem.
Alisa Bokulich (ch.10) and Valia Allori (ch.11) each challenge the central role
of the wavefunction in interpretations of QM. Bokulich discusses an alterna-
tive quantum formalism: Peter Holland’s Lagrangian Quantum Hydrodynamics
which represents quantum systems in terms of (parcels of) a continuous fluid
[Holland, 2005]. Allori discusses her Primitive Ontology approach according to
which the fundamental ontology of QM comprises matter in spacetime. Both
authors question the role of the wavefunction in QM in different ways. On
Bokulich’s view, the presence of an alternative formalism that doesn’t feature
the wavefunction shows that we shouldn’t take it to be representative of a novel
piece of physical ontology as proposed by Wavefunction Realists. Allori argues
that on her Primitive Ontology approach, the wavefunction should be viewed
as nomological—having to do with the laws characterizing the behavior of the
matter in spacetime. These proposals highlight another form of underdetermi-
nation: different versions of the main interpretations are possible depending on
how the wavefunction is viewed. The approach of Holland discussed by Bokulich
may be seen as providing a new interpretation or a new version of Bohmian me-
chanics. Allori’s Primitive Ontology approach yields a proliferation of variants
of each of the main interpretations.
Thus, the problem of underdetermination is not resolved by settling on a
preferred solution to the measurement problem. There are still questions about
how to develop its formalism and ontology. Bokulich explicitly endorses plural-
ism about the quantum formalism and Allori, though she introduces a number
of theoretical virtues to help winnow down the options, is left with two viable
options (pilot-wave theory and GRWf). So, the problem of quantum underde-
termination remains: there are multiple ways of telling a realist story about the
quantum world that are at odds with one another.
2 Explanation
Perhaps quantum underdetermination requires a more radical rethink of what it
is to interpret QM. If the trouble lies in giving a picture of the world described
by QM, perhaps this should be excised from the interpretative enterprise. This
would seem to lead straight to antirealism or instrumentalism, but advocates
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of pragmatist and QBist (formerly, Quantum Bayesian) approaches to QM re-
ject these titles. On these views, QM is primarily understood as a user’s guide
for agents navigating their world—it tells them what to expect and how much
credence to give certain predictions about the future. But, unlike familiar va-
rieties of antirealism, some of these views seek to provide genuine explanations
of predicted phenomena.
On Richard Healey’s pragmatist view (ch.7), QM explains by rendering the
explanandum expected and saying what it depends on. Suppose the explanan-
dum is a measurement outcome. Then facts about the preparation procedure
(specified in suitably non-quantum terms) and the quantum formalism yield
a probabilistic prediction about the measurement outcome. This prediction
should be treated as expert advice (in light of QM’s instrumental success) and
we should set our credences accordingly. If the prediction assigns a high prob-
ability to a certain outcome, then we should expect to find that outcome. So
far, this is a purely epistemic explanation, but Healey seeks to go further: QM
tells us that the outcome depends on the preparation in the usual counterfactual
sense—an intervention on the preparation procedure would have led to reliable
changes in the measurement outcome.
But there is something missing from Healey’s explanation. What exactly is
going on between preparation and measurement? Healey recognizes there is a
gap here, but argues that it doesn’t undermine his pragmatist approach’s realist
credentials: “The story provided by Newton’s theory was not rejected as anti-
realist despite the fact that it included no mechanism filling the gaps between
the sun and the earth on which it exerted a gravitational attraction” (p.125).
But there is an important difference between the two kinds of gaps. Newton’s
is a case of action at a distance—there is a force operating between the sun and
the earth instantaneously without anything mediating. But here there is a gap
in both space and time—we can’t say anything about the physical state of the
system between its preparation and measurement. There is another difference
as well: The quantum formalism seemingly represents the system during the
intervening time. Of course, it’s a contested matter exactly what the quantum
formalism is telling us about the system in that time, but it’s hard to see how
an explanation that eschews any attempt to use that formalism to tell us about
reality captures the spirit of scientific realism.
Indeed, as Peter Lewis (ch.9) argues, it’s not just that pragmatist QM is
uninformative about what’s going in the gap, but it actually precludes claims
about what might be happening. This is the result of Healey’s adoption of an
inferentialist semantics that ties content to environmental decoherence. This
has the consequence that a non-quantum description is only possible when the
quantum state of the system has suitably decohered. But gaps occur when
the quantum state is coherent, and hence, pragmatist QM requires that non-
quantum claims about the system during this period lack meaning.
Consideration of the formal results discussed by Wayne Myrvold (ch.12)
leads to a parallel conclusion. Healey’s pragmatism adopts a non-representational
view of the quantum state, which functions only as an “informational bridge”
connecting the non-quantum descriptions that provide the inputs and outputs
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of a quantum model [Healey, 2017]. Myrvold argues that recent no-go the-
orems [Pusey et al., 2012, Barrett et al., 2014] undermine anti-realism about
the quantum state and he provides a weaker version of the crucial assumption
on which their results rest. How can Healey’s pragmatism avoid these results?
The key lies in the Ontological Models framework used by the no-go theorems.
This framework assumes that individual physical systems possess an underly-
ing physical state and the quantum state reflects beliefs or information about
it. Healey (and QBists) deny this, but doing so comes at a significant cost:
One must deny not only that the quantum state represents the physical state
of the system, but also that it represents beliefs or information about what the
physical state might be. This reinforces the lesson that quantum pragmatism
precludes description of—or even speculation about—physical reality except in
special circumstances (e.g., measurement contexts).
Lina Jansson (ch.8) attempts to fortify Healey’s pragmatist explanations
while maintaining the idea that quantum models aren’t representational. She
claims that so long as the input into a quantum model is appropriate for the
physical situation and allows for an epistemic explanation of the output, we
have reason to think there’s a worldly dependence relation between (the physical
states associated with) the input and output. However, the worldly dependence
Jansson invokes will still be “gappy” in the above sense. Jansson takes the ontic
dependence in question to be non-causal, so the gap cannot be understood along
the lines of the action at a distance found in Newtonian gravitation. Again, the
question is whether an explanation that black-boxes the quantum formalism and
focuses only on its inputs and outputs can be regarded as a satisfactory realist
explanation. Regardless of terminology, such explanations are unlikely to satisfy
realists motivated by the need to provide ontic explanations of phenomena in
the scope of QM.
3 Fundamentality
The discussion so far has focused on interpretative issues as they arise in or-
dinary non-relativistic QM. Moving to quantum field theory (QFT) introduces
new challenges for scientific realists. One source of trouble is the fact that a
precise and mathematically rigorous treatment is only possible for free quantum
fields, not the interacting fields required for treating (among other things) what
goes on inside particle accelerators like the LHC. The version of interacting QFT
used by physicists involves adding perturbation terms to a free field to approxi-
mate physical quantities that can then be compared with experiment. However,
there’s a technical problem with this approach: The terms in the perturbative
expansion—a series of corrections to get ever closer to the real physics—fail to
converge, leading to problematic infinities.
The solution to this problem is a process called renomalization, which in-
volves imposing an energy cutoff, then reformulating the theory with new pa-
rameters that avoid the infinities. Originally, this process was viewed with
suspicion—a bit of mathematical trickery that somehow generates empirically
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adequate predictions—but developments in renormalization have led to a shift
in how the procedure is understood. And now, some philosophers argue that
renomalization allows realists to explain the extraordinary instrumental success
of QFT. The key insight is the idea of universality, the robustness of QFT under
changes to the physics beyond the cutoff energy. Effective Realism views QFT
as an effective field theory that only applies within a limited energy regime, but
nevertheless offers a faithful picture of reality in that domain.
James Fraser (ch.14) argues, following [Williams, 2019], that renormalization
allows us to understand QFT as a low-energy approximation of some unknown
final (fundamental) theory. The robustness of QFT under changes of that un-
derlying theory both explains why QFT works and identifies features of QFT
worthy of realist commitment. However, Laura Ruetsche (ch.15) pushes back
by noting that the class of underlying theories is not exhaustive, and hence,
we cannot be sure that QFT is compatible with future physics. Moreover, she
points out that the features identified by renomalization as being robust (e.g.,
low-energy correlation functions1) admit of an empiricist reading. This means
that the Effective Realist must argue for a particular physical interpretation of
these features to endorse, which allows the problem of underdetermination to
resurface. Moreover, as J. Fraser notes, the measurement problem remains in
QFT, and with it the problem of underdetermination discussed above.
Ruetsche argues for a humble empiricism toward QFT: “In experimentally-
accessible regimes, [QFT] approximates [the unknown final theory] Tfinal’s pre-
dictions” (p.309). That is, rather than the realist’s commitment to the ap-
proximate truth of QFT—i.e., that it approximates the unknown final theory—
humble empiricism commits only to QFT’s approximate empirical equivalence
to the final theory. Note that in both cases, approximation is given a specific
meaning as agreement in a certain low-energy regime.
However, while empiricism is certainly an option, realists will demand more
of an explanation for QFT’s success.Why does QFT approximate the predictions
of Tfinal? A natural thought is that it approximates more than just Tfinal’s
predictions. This is further supported by the robustness of certain features of
QFT. If these features (e.g., low-energy correlation functions) can be given a
realist treatment, then there’s the potential for a deeper explanation of QFT’s
empirical success. It’s not just that QFT makes the same predictions as the final
theory, it also agrees with the final theory about certain features responsible for
those predictions. Of course, the problem of the physical interpretation of these
features remains, as well as Ruetsche’s worry that the class of final theories
considered is limited, but neither is insurmountable. The realist can argue
for a particular physical interpretation of (e.g.,) correlation functions or else
embrace pluralism about them. And granting that the robustness is limited,
the realist should recognize that their commitments are fallible—leaving open
the possibility that physics will develop in an unanticipated direction.
One promising option here is structural realism, which takes the mathemat-
1J. Fraser characterizes these as “expectation values of products of field operators associ-
ated with well-separated space-time regions” (p.286), cf. Ruetsche (p.306).
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ical structures in our best theories to approximate physical structures in the
world. In the case of QFT, the structural realist can (fallibly) endorse robust
features of QFT such as the correlation functions without committing to a com-
plete ontology tied to a particular interpretation. As long as there is something
in the world with a structure that instantiates the correlation functions roughly
as they’re described by QFT, this provides an explanatory basis for QFT’s em-
pirical success. Moreover, their robustness provides good reason to think they
will be preserved (at least as a low energy approximation) in future theories.
Doreen Fraser (ch.13), challenges the application of structural realism to
QFT on the basis of purely formal analogies. She highlights the role of for-
mal analogies with superconductivity in the development of the Higgs model.
Initially, the presence of formal analogies may seem like grist for the mill of
the structural realist, who abandons the standard realist’s commitment to an
ontology of individuals with intrinsic properties, about which formally similar
theories will often differ. But, D. Fraser rejects the structural realist treatment
of her case: “There are no physical analogies; the formal analogies do not map
physical relations to physical relations of the same type. In particular, nei-
ther causal nor modal relations are preserved by the mappings, which precludes
two prominent structural realist strategies for characterizing physical structure”
(p.270).
While structural realism has often focused on causal or modal structure,
these may not exhaust what qualifies as physical structure. The structural real-
ist may insist that formal analogies are indicative of shared physical structure,
even if that structure can only be characterized abstractly. So long as that struc-
ture is instantiated by a physical system, then it is physical structure despite
our inability to characterize it in familiar causal or modal terms. Another way
the structural realist may respond to D. Fraser’s challenge is to reject the place
of formal analogies in explaining the success of the Higgs model. One can grant
that the analogy with superconductivity models was helpful in the development
of the Higgs model—by correcting misconceptions about symmetry breaking—
without it playing a role in explaining why the theory is successful. D. Fraser
takes the realist explanandum to be the successful use of formal analogies, but
another plausible target is the instrumental success of the Higgs model itself. If
this is taken to be the explanandum, then it’s not clear why the use of a purely
formal analogy to clarify a misconception tells against the faithfulness of the
representation provided by the Higgs model.
4 Conclusion
The challenges posed by underdetermination, explanation, and fundamentality
remain unresolved. As a result, we must rethink both scientific realism and QM.
This volume represents an excellent first step in this process and the questions
it raises—some of which I’ve articulated above—serve as invitations for entry
into this important area of philosophical exploration.
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